University of Tulsa College of Law

TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works

2017

Coercion, Fraud, and What is Wrong With
Blackmail
Stephen Galoob

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons
Recommended Citation
Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With Blackmail, 22 Leg. Theory 22. doi:10.1017/S1352325216000082

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.

Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With Blackmail
COERCION, FRAUD, AND WHAT IS WRONG WITH BLACKMAIL
forthcoming in LEGAL THEORY
Stephen Galoob
University of Tulsa College of Law
Abstract
Several theorists argue that blackmail is morally wrong because the blackmail proposal is
coercive. These coercion-based views are promising but incomplete. A full explanation
of blackmail’s immorality must address both the blackmail proposal and the blackmail
agreement. I defend what I call the complex account, on which blackmail is morally
wrong because blackmail proposals are coercive and blackmail agreements are
fraudulent. The complex account avoids difficulties that beset other coercion-based views
and provides a stronger case for why blackmail should be criminalized.
Several scholars argue that blackmail is morally wrong because it is coercive.1 These
coercion-based views focus on the blackmail proposal, the blackmailer’s offer or threat to
act in a certain way (paradigmatically, to disclose information whose revelation would
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James R. Shaw, The Morality of Blackmail, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165 (2012); Mitchell
Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 795 (1998); Mitchell Berman, Blackmail, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 37–106 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011);
Dan Fitzpatrick, The Philosophy of Blackmail: Indecent Offers or Coercive Proposals, 29
J. SOC. PHIL. 37 (1998); Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 43 (1992); Grant Lamond, Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of
Blackmail, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 215–238 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds.,
1996).
1
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harm or embarrass the target of blackmail) unless the target agrees to the blackmailer’s
demands. On James Shaw’s simple account, the typical blackmail proposal wrongs the
target by unjustifiably impinging his authority to decide what to do.
Coercion-based views are a genuine breakthrough for explaining the immorality
of blackmail, which is one of the most-discussed questions in criminal law. Yet although
coercion-based views capture a core aspect of why blackmail is wrong, they are
incomplete. They do not explain everything that is wrong with blackmail, nor do they
offer a fully convincing explanation of why blackmail should be criminalized. Meeting
these challenges requires analyzing the blackmail agreement as well as the blackmail
proposal.
In this article I defend the complex account of why blackmail is wrong. On this
view, blackmail is typically wrong because the blackmail proposal is coercive and the
agreement contemplated in that proposal is fraudulent. The complex account is a friendly
amendment to coercion-based views like Shaw’s simple account. Compared to
alternatives, the complex account provides a more complete explanation of why
blackmail is immoral and a stronger case for why blackmail should be criminally
prohibited.
Section I summarizes Shaw’s simple account and raises some difficulties that
apply both to this view and to coercion-based views more broadly. Section II articulates
and defends the complex account. I provide a contingent argument that blackmail is
appropriately criminalized because many blackmail agreements are fraudulent, as well as
a more categorical argument that blackmail agreements are fraudulent in any just legal
system. The complex account preserves the strengths of Shaw’s simple account while
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avoiding its difficulties. In the Conclusion, I discuss some general implications of the
complex account for theorizing about blackmail. Appendix 1 shows how the complex
account can be used to supplement another coercion-based view, Mitchell Berman’s
evidentiary theory of blackmail.

I. WHY BLACKMAIL IS WRONG: COERCION
Subsection A analyzes the strengths of coercion-based views, focusing on Shaw’s simple
account. I focus on the simple account not to endorse it but because, along with Berman’s
evidentiary theory, it is the best developed coercion-based view. Subsection B describes
some difficulties facing the simple account and many other theories of why blackmail is
wrong.
A. Shaw’s Simple Account
To orient the discussion, consider the following episode, “probably the most famous
blackmail attempt in history,”2 from the life of Oscar Wilde. William Allen, a
professional blackmailer, obtained several letters from Wilde to Lord Alfred Douglas that
referenced Wilde’s sexual conduct with young men. Wilde later testified that Allen
approached him by noting that “a very curious construction could be put upon” one of
Wilde’s letters to Douglas. Wilde recounted the following exchange:
“Art is rarely intelligible to the criminal classes.” [Allen] said, “A man offered
me £6o for it.” [Wilde then] said to [Allen], “If you take my advice you will go to
that man and sell my letter to him for £6o. I myself have never received so large a
sum for any prose work of that length; but I am glad to find that there is some one
in England who considers a letter of mine worth £6o.”3
Once it became clear that Wilde would not agree to the proposal, Allen “changed
his manner” and admitted living in desperate poverty. Wilde gave Allen a half-sovereign
out of pity, and Allen later returned the incriminating letter to Wilde.
2

ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL BLACKMAIL: A MODERN HISTORY (2002), at 22.

3

RICHARD ELLMANN, THE TRIAL OF OSCAR WILDE (1996), at 419.
3
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From Wilde’s case, we can identify two notions that are important for analyzing
the wrongfulness of blackmail. First, the blackmail proposal is the blackmailer’s
indication of an intention to do X (for example, to disclose a secret of the target) unless
the target and blackmailer enter into an agreement under which the target agrees to do Y
(paradigmatically, to pay money to the blackmailer) and the blackmailer agrees not to do
X. In order for the proposal to be an instance of blackmail, the blackmailer’s X-ing must
have the antecedent deontic status of being permissible.4
In Wilde’s case, the blackmail proposal was Allen’s indication of his intent to
disclose the incriminating contents of Wilde’s letter if Wilde did not pay Allen at least
£60. Implicit in this proposal is that Allen would agree not to disclose the contents of
Wilde’s letter if Wilde agreed to pay Allen at least £60. Assume for the sake of argument
that Allen’s disclosing the contents of Wilde’s letter would have the antecedent status of
being permissible, since it would be neither forbidden nor required.5
Second, we can preliminarily define the blackmail agreement or exchange6 as the
transaction, prompted by the blackmail proposal, by which the target agrees (and
therefore incurs an obligation) to do Y, the blackmailer agrees (and incurs an obligation)
not to do X, and these obligations interdepend in the way that is constitutive of

4

The antecedent permissibility of doing X is sometimes said to differentiate blackmail
from extortion, where the action referenced in the proposal is antecedently impermissible.
See Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1567
(1993), at 1599.
5

Some might dispute this assumption on the grounds that since sodomy was a crime in
Britain at the time of Allen’s proposal, Allen’s failure to disclose would have violated a
moral or legal duty to disclose information of criminal wrongdoing to authorities. JOEL
FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988), at 241–245.
6

The term blackmail exchange is more prominent in the literature, but the term blackmail
agreement seems more accurate. I use these terms synonymously.
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agreements.7 Not all blackmail proposals lead to agreements. For example, Allen and
Wilde did not enter into a blackmail agreement. In refusing Allen’s proposal, Wilde did
not put himself under a new obligation to pay Allen any sum. Likewise, because Wilde
refused his proposal, Allen incurred no new obligation to keep the contents of Wilde’s
letter secret.
Wilde’s case shows how the existence of a blackmail agreement depends on the
interrelated intentions and behaviors of the parties. In the wake of a blackmail proposal,
the blackmailer might refrain from doing X and the target might do Y. Yet there is no
agreement if these actions do not respond to the blackmail proposal. For example, Wilde
actually paid Allen some money, but because he felt sorry for Allen rather than in
exchange for Allen’s silence. Wilde’s action was occasioned by Allen’s proposal but was
not a response to it. Likewise, Allen handed over Wilde’s letter, but not in exchange for
Wilde’s payment. Thus Wilde and Allen did not enter into a blackmail agreement, even
though each behaved in a way (Wilde paying Allen money, Allen handing over Wilde’s
letter) consistent with them having entered into such an agreement.
Shaw’s simple account aims to explain why blackmail is morally wrong. In
general, he contends, a “coercive announcement” like the blackmail proposal is morally
“impermissible if it attaches a sanction to an option in an agent’s deliberation that the
agent is entitled to deliberate about.”8 Shaw does not offer a full description of “when an

7

Hanoch Sheinman, Agreement as Joint Promise, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 365 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011), at 369–370. I refine this
preliminary definition in Section II.A.
8

Shaw, supra note 1, at 166.
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agent is entitled to deliberate about an available action without sanction.”9 Rather, he
identifies a common feature: if I am entitled to decide whether to perform an action, then
you would wrong me by attaching sanctions to my performance of that action in a way
that interferes with my deliberation on this matter.10 If you would wrong me by
interfering with matters over which I have the right to deliberate, then you would also
wrong me by communicating that you will interfere with my deliberation.11
The simple account therefore holds not only that blackmail is wrong but also that
it wrongs the target distinctly by impinging on his or her deliberative authority. This
infringement is significant even if it does not also set back the target’s interests overall. In
the paradigmatic blackmail case, the target has the “default discretionary authority” to
“go about [his or her] business without compensating the blackmailer.”12 By making the
proposal, the blackmailer attempts to “undu[ly] influence[]” the target’s exercising this
authority by raising the costs of exercising it.13 Although Shaw does not use these terms,
the wrongfulness of this influence can be seen as a form of what Arthur Ripstein calls
“usurpation.”14 In making the blackmail proposal, the blackmailer is a usurper because he

9

Id. at 167.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 168.

12

Id. at 175.

13

Id. at 177.

14

ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(2009), at 54. On Ripstein’s Kantian view, “you are independent only if you are the one
who decides what ends you will use your powers to pursue, as opposed to having
someone else decide for you.” Id. at 33. Someone else can interfere with your
independence by either usurping or destroying your powers to set and pursue purposes.
Id. at 43. When someone usurps your powers, he “deprives you of the ability to be able to
decline to pursue purposes unless you have set them.” Id. at 44. For Ripstein, usurping
6
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attempts to get the target to exercise his default discretionary authority for the
blackmailer’s purposes.15
This brief description of the simple account seems to raise a tension. On the
definition offered above, the action referenced in the blackmail proposal is antecedently
permissible. Yet the simple account suggests that the blackmail proposal renders doing X
impermissible, which in turn renders impermissible the conditional proposal to do X. So,
one might wonder, is doing X permissible, or is it not?

your powers amounts to “using” you, insofar as the usurpation renders your choice
subject to someone else’s will and deprives you of the “ability to decide what to do” for
yourself. Id. Japa Pallikkathayil defends a similar notion of coercion as usurpation. See
Japa Pallikkathayil, The Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem with
Coercion, 11 PHIL. IMPRINT 18 (2011).
“Usurpation” is not the only or even the most common way to construe the wrongfulness
of coercion. Alternative accounts focus on different features, such as the ways that
coercion negates reciprocity and therefore violates the target’s moral equality; see, e.g.,
STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT (2006), at 22; or puts the target
in a position “where her goals become self-undermining”; Saba Bazargan, Moral
Coercion, 14 PHIL. IMPRINT 1 (2014), at 6; or constitutes an irresponsible act of reasoncreation by the coercer; A.J. Julius, The Possibility of Exchange, 12 POL. PHIL. & ECON.
361 (2013), at 362–363; or brings about a relationship in which the target is dominated by
the coercer; Scott Anderson, The Enforcement Approach to Coercion, 5 J. ETHICS & SOC.
PHIL. (2010); Niko Kolodny, What Makes Threats Wrong, forthcoming in ANALYTIC
PHILOSOPHY); or wrongfully puts pressure on the target’s will or liberty to do otherwise;
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987); Mitchell Berman, The Normative Functions of
Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45 (2002).
Coercion-based accounts of blackmail differ, inter alia, based on the notions of wrongful
coercion that they utilize. For example, Lamond explains the wrongfulness of coercion in
terms of domination: in coercing the target, the blackmailer attempts to obtain (over the
target’s objections or invalid consent) “whatever [he] demand[s]” of the target.” Lamond,
supra note 1, at 233–234. By contrast, Berman’s evidentiary theory incorporates the
“wrongful pressure” notion of coercion. See Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 66–67.
For Berman, blackmail proposals are coercive when the action referenced in the proposal
would, if carried out, wrongfully set back certain of the target’s interests, and the
prospect of this wrongful harming exerts pressure on the target’s liberty or will.
15

RIPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 43. See also Lamond, supra note 1, at 219.
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Shaw resolves this tension by arguing that whether an agent acts permissibly can
“be sensitive to the motives and values of that agent.”16 Some object to this position
generally, and for that reason would be inclined to reject the simple account. For the sake
of argument, assume that intentions can bear directly on the permissibility of actions.
However, based on this assumption, it is premature to say above that the X-ing referenced
in the blackmail proposal is antecedently permissible. More accurately, doing X could be
permissible if it were done for the right reasons. However, after the blackmailer makes
the proposal, it can be inferred that his later doing X would be impermissible because it
would not be done for the right reasons.17
But how, exactly, does making the blackmail proposal indicate that the
blackmailer’s later doing X would not be done for the right reasons? To support this
inference, Shaw identifies a “subtle form of moral turpitude” that he calls “impermissible
disregard.”18 According to Shaw, you show impermissible disregard for my well-being
by knowingly creating harms for me that are “not appropriately offset” by the value of
“your own furthered ends,” even if the creation of these harms could have been justified
in furtherance of some worthwhile goal.19 In paradigmatic cases of informational
blackmail, the target has a default discretionary authority regarding paying the
blackmailer money and entering into an agreement with him. By proposing to release the
information if the target refuses to enter into a blackmail agreement, the blackmailer
attaches sanctions to the target’s decisions regarding these issues. These actions attempt
16

Shaw, supra note 1, at 171.

17

Id. at 170–171; see also Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 69–70.

18

Shaw, supra note 1, at 169.

19

Id. at 170.
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to usurp the target’s deliberative authority, and they also manifest an impermissible lack
of concern for his interests.20
The simple account can cleanly explain the wrong in Wilde’s case. Allen’s
statement to Wilde implied that Allen would expose Wilde’s letter unless Wilde entered
into an agreement. The sexual behavior referenced in the letter was criminal in England
at the time. Revelation of Wilde’s secret would severely harm his reputation and,
eventually, land him in prison. Wilde clearly had a general authority to decide whether to
transfer funds to Allen.21 In making his proposal to Wilde, Allen attempted to take
control Wilde’s authority to make this decision. Although some considerations might
have justified Allen in taking control of Wilde’s authority in this domain, “that Allen
wanted to get at least £60” or “that Allen wanted to punish Wilde for refusing to enter
into a blackmail agreement whereby Allen would have obtained £60” are insufficient
reasons to do so.
The simple account appraises blackmail’s wrongfulness in terms of the blackmail
proposal. As Shaw notes, “[i]n the case of impermissible coercion, it is the announcement

20

Id. at 172. Thus it is perhaps more accurate to characterize Shaw as offering a
“usurpation and disregard” account of wrongful coercion—usurping someone’s
deliberative authority is what makes a proposal coercive, and the disregard animating the
proposal is (at least part of) what makes the proposal wrongful. My contention that Shaw
offers a “usurpation” account of wrongful coercion should be read to include this proviso.
21

One might also contend, somewhat anachronistically, that Wilde had authority to
decide whether to reveal information about his sexual behavior to the world. However,
whether Allen’s proposal is coercive does not depend on whether Wilde has the right to
control the disclosure of this information. As noted above, Shaw sees the infringement of
the target’s default discretionary authority as sufficient to make the blackmail proposal
wrong. Id. at 193. In other words, Allen’s blackmail proposal would have been
objectionably coercive even if Wilde had no entitlement regarding the disclosure of
information about his sexual behavior.
9
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(prototypically) that constitutes the way of tampering with another’s deliberation.”22
Blackmail is coercive even if, as in Wilde’s case, the proposal does not lead to an
exchange and the blackmailer never makes good on his expressed intention to do X. The
simple account thus captures the inchoate nature of blackmail, or the way the wrong of
blackmailing is accomplished “upon issuance of the [blackmail] proposal” rather than
upon execution of a blackmail agreement.23
In addition to capturing the inchoate nature of blackmail, the simple account has
many other strengths. Like other coercion-based views, the simple account dissolves the
so-called “paradox of blackmail,” the question of how the blackmail proposal could be
morally or legally impermissible when each of its components (the blackmailer’s doing
X; the blackmailer and target entering into an agreement whereby the blackmailer is
obligated not do X and the target is obligated to Y) seems morally and legally
permissible.24 The simple account also resolves the so-called “second paradox of

22

Id. at 177.

23

Russell Christopher, A Political Theory of Blackmail: A Reply to Professor Dripps, 3
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 261 (2009), 265. Most extant criminal laws construe blackmail as an
inchoate crime, in that liability attaches on the making of the proposal (rather than when a
blackmail agreement is reached). See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of
Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (1984), at 676 n. 31.
24

Lindgren, supra note 23; Glanville Williams, Blackmail, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 79
(1954), at 79–92, 162–172, 240–246. Others have contended that the legal version of the
paradox is not strictly paradoxical, since many criminal offenses consist of components
that are each morally and legally permitted. Michael Clark, There Is No Paradox of
Blackmail, 54 ANALYSIS 54 (1994). The simple account provides an additional way to
resolve the first paradox: there is no paradox because the blackmail proposal changes the
status of doing X for the blackmailer. In making the proposal, the blackmailer both
infringes the target’s deliberative authority and makes it the case that future X-ing would
manifest disregard for the target.
10
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blackmail,” which asks why blackmailer-initiated proposals regarding doing X are
morally impermissible whereas target-initiated proposals are not.25

B. Three Difficulties
Despite these strengths, Shaw’s simple account faces several difficulties. These
difficulties also apply to other coercion-based accounts as well as to a variety of
approaches that explain the wrongfulness of blackmail on grounds other than coercion.
1. The Ratification Objection
One set of difficulties concerns how the creation of a blackmail agreement might affect
the wrongfulness of the blackmail proposal. The simple account has no response to the
argument that the objectionable features of the blackmail proposal can be obviated when
the blackmailer and target enter into an agreement. This argument, which I call the
ratification objection, holds that the creation of the agreement can (at least in some
circumstances) obviate the wrong-making features of the proposal.26
25

Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1663 (1993). On the simple account, the blackmailer’s announcement attempts to
usurp the target’s deliberative authority. If (as in the case of target-initiated proposals)
there is no announcement by the blackmailer, then there is no attempt by the blackmailer
to usurp this authority. A target-initiated proposal is an exercise of deliberative authority
by the target rather than an attempted usurpation of that authority by the blackmailer.
Shaw, supra note 1, at 178–179.
26

The notion that a party’s actions can ratify (and therefore validate) an otherwise invalid
agreement is a staple of contract law. See Joseph M. Perillo & John E. Murray, Jr. 1
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1.6 (2015) (in cases of voidable contracts, “the agreement may
be made fully operative as against both of the parties, by the exercise of a power of
ratification” by the “injured party with the power of avoidance”).
A. John Simmons’s discussion of loyalty oaths and refugees is based on a version of the
ratification objection. A state’s demand that people obey its laws is, for Simmons, a
paradigmatic example of coercion, since it involves taking control over subjects’
individual authority to decide which obligations will apply to them. Thus a state that
conditions the provision of citizenship to a victim of foreign repression only if the
refugee takes such an oath makes a coercive proposal. Yet, Simmons argues, the validity
of such an oath is an open question, one whose answer depends on whether the refugee
had reasonable options other than taking the naturalization oath. A. John Simmons,
Voluntarism and Political Associations, 67 VA. L. REV. 19 (1981), at 35–36. To be sure,
many versions of voluntarism would dispute Simmons’s logic. However, the implication
of Simmons’s argument is that the significance of any coercive features of the citizenship
proposal can be obviated when the refugee takes the oath. Thus the ratification objection
is viable on Simmons’s version of voluntarism, albeit perhaps not on other versions.
11
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There are two aspects to the ratification objection. The first aspect is the claim
that agreeing to a wrongful proposal could change the wrongfulness of the proposal. If a
blackmail proposal is coercive, then (on the usurpation notion of coercion) it wrongfully
impinges on the target’s deliberative authority. Yet part of having this deliberative
authority seems to include the power to change the status or blame-aptness of actions that
would otherwise wrong one or violate one’s rights.27 This exercise is consent when it
occurs prior to the wrongdoing or violation and it is ratification when it occurs afterward.
The second aspect is the claim that when someone attempts to impinge on an agent’s
deliberation, entering into an agreement regarding the subject of the attempted
impingement actually does ratify that impingement. According to the ratification
objection, then, the target’s entering into the blackmail agreement could (and sometimes
does) change the wrongfulness of the impingement in the blackmail proposal.28

27

See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE (2012), ch. 11.

28

In correspondence, Shaw suggests a different way to deny the ratification objection
from the one proposed here. Rather than disputing whether any blackmail agreement does
ratify the usurpation implicit in the blackmail proposal, Shaw might deny that any
agreement could change the usurpation implicit in the proposal. The argument, drawing
from Pallikkathayil’s notion of “impaired normative authority,” is that a coercive
proposal by a blackmailer necessarily invalidates the target’s default discretionary
authority, including his authority to enter into agreements. See Pallikkathayil, supra note
14, at 17, 19; see also David Owens, Duress, Deception, and the Validity of a Promise,
116 MIND 293 (2007), at 304–305; Ram Rivlin, Blackmail, Subjectivity and Culpability,
28 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 399 (2015), at 419–421; Lamond, supra note 1, at 234.
However, this “impaired normative authority” strategy seems to get the wrong answer in
a variety of blackmail scenarios. In Wilde’s actual case, it would imply that Wilde could
not have made a valid promise to Allen in the wake of Allen’s proposal. Yet Wilde’s
actual transfer of a half-sovereign to Allen seems valid. If Wilde had filched the coin
from Allen’s purse after having handed it over, then Wilde would have been stealing.
Since Wilde had the power to give a sovereign to Allen, it seems to follow that Wilde
also had the power to promise to give Allen a half-sovereign.
12
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Consider a real-world example of the ratification objection. Under U.S. law,
sexual harassment is a form of gender discrimination and therefore violates the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Many tokens of sexual harassment are coercive in exactly the way
that blackmail proposals are. For example, in the prototype of quid pro quo sexual
harassment, the harasser’s proposal references an act that he is otherwise entitled perform
(e.g., firing, demoting, or refusing to hire the target) unless the target enters an exchange
whereby the harasser agrees not to act in this way and the target agrees to have sex with
the harasser. The prevailing legal view in the U.S. is that only “unwanted” conduct can
constitute sexual harassment.29 The U.S. Supreme Court has found that a plaintiff’s
actions (like participating in sexually charged banter or assenting to a sexual relationship
with the harasser) can support the inference that ostensibly harassing behavior was not
unwanted and thus change whether such behavior was coercive sexual harassment in the
first place.30 The Court’s reasoning here reflects a form of the ratification objection: in
the wake of an objectionable proposal, a subordinate’s acquiescence to the proposal from
a superior can change whether the proposal has the significance that coercive proposals
typically have.
Many scholars see the U.S. Supreme Court’s focus on unwelcomeness as
mistaken. Yet the ratification objection seems more broadly incorrect in contexts like
sexual harassment and blackmail. In the wake of these kinds of coercive proposals (e.g.,
“have sex with me or you will lose your job” or “agree to pay me or I will expose your
secret”), the target’s mere acquiescence does not usually change whether the proposal has
29

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (“The gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’”).
30

Id.
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the significance that wrongful proposals have. Targeting someone for blackmail or sexual
harassment in these ways is objectionable, even if the target accedes to the proposal.
The simple account focuses on the wrongfulness of proposals and so lacks the
resources to dispute the ratification objection on these grounds. Explaining why entering
into a blackmail agreement does not typically cleanse blackmail of its impermissibility
requires identifying wrong-making features of certain kinds of agreements independently
of the wrong-making features of proposals.
2. The Compounding Effect
The ratification objection is not merely mistaken but backward. Typically, in the wake of
a blackmail proposal, the target’s entering into a blackmail agreement amplifies rather
than obviates the wrongfulness of the blackmailer’s conduct. Call this the compounding
effect.
A variety of theories can appreciate the compounding effect. Since the emphasis
so far has been on the simple account, assume (with Shaw) that blackmail is wrongful
because the proposal usurps the target’s deliberative authority in a way that manifests
disregard for him or her. In Wilde’s actual case, Allen’s blackmail proposal was rejected.
Consider this variation on the case:
Wilde1: Wilde agrees to the exchange that Allen proposes. As a result of this
agreement, Allen incurs an obligation not to reveal Wilde’s letter to authorities
and Wilde incurs an obligation to pay Allen £60.
It seems to me that Allen would commit a greater wrong in Wilde1 than he did in
real life. This difference should be appreciable to any coercion-based view, and
especially if the wrongfulness of coercion is appreciated in terms of “usurpation.” If the

14
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agreement between Allen and Wilde were valid,31 then Wilde’s acquiescence to the
proposal would appear to change his normative situation. After entering the agreement,
Allen would have a “distinctive standing, authority, or sovereignty in relation to”
Wilde.32 Any subsequent effort by Wilde to avoid paying for Allen’s silence would
wrong Allen, since it would violate Allen’s authority over Wilde. Yet this development
seems perverse. In making the blackmail proposal, the blackmailer wrongfully seeks to
exercise control over the target’s deliberative authority. This attempted usurpation would
succeed if the blackmailer were to acquire the power to change what the target is
permitted or required to do going forward.
The simple account has difficulty explaining the compounding effect for the same
reasons that it has difficulty resisting the ratification objection. The simple account
focuses on the coerciveness of the announcement, but it does not examine whether that
announcement “has some actual effect on [the target’s] deliberation”33 or the power
relations between the blackmailer and target. The simple account therefore could not
identify a meaningful difference between the coerciveness of Allen in Wilde1 and in
Wilde’s actual case (where the proposal was rejected). Yet this conclusion is both
counterintuitive and inconsistent with the usurpation notion of coercion. If the agreement
between Wilde and Allen is valid, then Wilde1 involves a successful rather than merely
attempted usurpation of Wilde’s default discretionary authority. On the assumption that
coercion is wrongful because it interferes with someone’s discretionary authority,

31

I relax this assumption infra at note 89.

32

Stephen Darwall, Demystifying Promises, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 255 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011), at 259.
33

Shaw, supra note 1, at 166 n. 3.
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actually acquiring the power to change someone’s normative situation would be a greater
interference (and more wrongful) than an unsuccessful attempt to acquire this power.34
A full explanation of why blackmail is wrong should therefore both resist the
ratification objection and capture (or else explain away) the compounding effect. Because
the simple account focuses on the wrongfulness of the blackmail proposal, it cannot
easily meet either of these challenges.
3. Criminalizing Blackmail
A third set of challenges concerns criminalization. Most people believe that blackmail is
immoral and also that it should be illegal.35 This intuition is realized in the law, since
blackmail is illegal in every U.S. jurisdiction and under the laws of every Commonwealth
country. Indeed, theoretical discussions of blackmail usually aim to justify these legal
prohibitions, with the moral wrongfulness of blackmail typically relevant as a premise in
an argument about why blackmail should be criminalized.36 Likewise, those who favor
the decriminalization of blackmail often concede (at least for the sake of argument) that
many tokens of blackmail are immoral but deny that this immorality is sufficient to
justify legal prohibition.37
Shaw’s argument for the simple account analyzes blackmail as a moral
phenomenon. Yet the simple account strongly (and perhaps uniquely) supports
decriminalizing blackmail. Shaw contends that if the reasons for legally prohibiting
blackmail parallel the reasons that blackmail is morally wrong, then there is a tension in

34

The compounding effect is also appreciable on alternative notions of wrongful
coercion, as discussed in the appendix in connection with the “wrongful pressure” notion
of coercion that undergirds Berman’s evidentiary theory.
35

Experimental work by Paul Robinson and colleagues supports this conjecture. Paul H.
Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Daniel M. Bartels, Competing Theories of Blackmail: An
Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291 (2011).
36

E.g., Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 67 and 71–73.
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See, e.g., Eric Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273 (1982); Walter
Block, The Crime of Blackmail: A Libertarian Critique, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1999),
at 8–9.
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the law.38 Blackmail proposals are illegal, and releasing truthful information about
someone is legal. Yet both kinds of cases can involve infringements of the target’s
deliberative rights in a way that manifests an impermissible disregard for his or her
interests or authority.39 To clear up this tension, Shaw argues that we should either revise
what criminal law prohibits or else change how we justify this prohibition. Shaw suggests
three options: decriminalize blackmail; criminalize otherwise lawful information releases
when they manifest disregard for a target; or allow “nonmoral concerns” (such as free
speech values or epistemic doubts about identifying the reasons for which someone acts)
to justify the difference in treatment.40
Shaw does not indicate which of these options he favors, but only the
decriminalization option seems viable. Any liberal account of criminalization would have
difficulty justifying an arrangement in which information releases that manifested
impermissible disregard were prohibited whereas otherwise identical information releases
that did not manifest such disregard were decriminalized.41 Likewise, justifying
blackmail’s criminalization in nonmoral terms would be revisionist, since the intuition
that blackmail should be legally prohibited seems intimately connected with the intuition
that blackmail is morally wrong.42
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Shaw, supra note 1, at 195.
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Id.
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Id. at 195–196; see also Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 72–73.
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See Joel Feinberg, Some Unswept Debris from the Hart-Devlin Debate, 72 SYNTHESE
249 (1987), at 259–260.
42

Saul Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying about Blackmail?, 55 ANALYSIS 116 (1995),
at 120.
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Furthermore, the simple account has difficulty responding to perhaps the most
powerful abolitionist argument: that any coercion-based case for criminalizing blackmail
will also call for criminalizing a variety of “hard economic transactions” that presumably
should not be criminalized.43 To pull off this argument, the abolitionist postulates a licit
economic transaction that involves exactly the same considerations that purportedly make
blackmail wrongful—on Shaw’s view, that the proposal is an attempt to usurp the target’s
deliberative authority and manifests impermissible disregard for him. Shaw offers the
case of Fred the Landlord and Lucy the Tenant to illustrate impermissible disregard,44
and the case can be modified slightly in order to invoke the usurpation notion of
coercion.45 Shaw concludes that Fred’s actions towards Lucy are immoral, yet he
concedes that they are within Fred’s “legal rights.”46 If so, then the coerciveness of a
transaction type is insufficient to justify criminalizing (proposals to engage in) that
transaction type—exactly as the abolitionist contends.
Thus the simple account has a tendency toward abolitionism. To the extent that
the simple account can explain why blackmail is morally wrong, it cannot explain why
blackmail should be illegal or why this illegality is a function of blackmail’s moral
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Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156 (1980); Russell
Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, 94 GEO. L.J. 739 (2006), at 768–769.
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In Shaw’s example, Fred is a landlord, and Lucy his tenant on a monthly lease. Fred
has previously warned Lucy that he may terminate their arrangement on short notice,
although he realizes that doing so would make things very difficult for Lucy. Shaw
supposes that Fred decides to terminate the lease for the not-very-good reason that “he
has grown a little tired of having Lucy in the building.” Shaw, supra note 1, at 169–170.
45

For example, Fred could tell Lucy, “I will kick you out unless you start looking for a
new job,” even though Fred could not care less about what job Lucy has.
46

Shaw, supra note 1, at 170.
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wrongfulness. Nor can it differentiate blackmail from hard (but licit) commercial
transactions.
To be sure, this abolitionist tendency does not necessarily provide grounds for
rejecting the simple account. Despite the ubiquity of blackmail’s criminalization,
abolitionism might be the correct legal position. Nor does a tendency toward abolitionism
challenge the simple account on its own terms. Shaw’s primary aim is to analyze
blackmail as a moral phenomenon, so it is not an internal criticism of his argument that
the simple account fails to resolve the legal puzzle of blackmail. However, in order to
avoid abolitionism or a revisionist case for criminalizing blackmail, the simple account
requires supplementation.
In summary, Shaw’s simple account provides a powerful explanation of why
blackmail is coercive. It also captures the inchoate nature of blackmail and dissolves two
so-called paradoxes of blackmail. However, the simple account is incomplete. It cannot
rule out that entering into a blackmail agreement ameliorates the objectionable aspects of
the blackmail proposal, nor can it explain why a blackmailer’s wrongdoing might be
amplified when the target agrees to the proposal. Further, the simple account’s case for
why blackmail is morally wrong has either abolitionist or revisionist implications
regarding the criminalization of blackmail.
The difficulties facing Shaw’s simple account generalize to other coercion-based
account of blackmail.47 Like many other theories (and nearly every other coercion-based
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Space constraints prevent a full defense of this claim. However, I demonstrate in the
appendix why the difficulties facing the simple account also apply to Berman’s
evidentiary theory (which utilizes a different notion of coercion).
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account),48 the simple account explains the wrongfulness of blackmail in terms of the
blackmail proposal. Yet, if the arguments in this Subsection are sound, then addressing
the ratification objection and the compounding effect requires analyzing the blackmail
agreement as well as the blackmail proposal. Furthermore, any coercion-based view faces
significant (and, according to some, insurmountable) difficulty in explaining why
blackmail is appropriately criminalized whereas other kinds of transactions that involve
the same degree of coercion are licit.49

II. WHY BLACKMAIL IS WRONG: A COMPLEX ACCOUNT
It is possible to preserve the strengths of a coercion-based view like the simple account
while avoiding these difficulties. The simple account and other coercion-based views
largely focus on the wrong-making features of the blackmail proposal and neglect the
wrong-making features of the blackmail agreement. The following view remedies this
shortcoming:
Complex Account: Blackmail is wrong because (i) the blackmail proposal is
coercive; and/or (ii) the blackmail agreement contemplated in the proposal is
fraudulent.
The explanation for (i) can vary based on the coercion-based account that one
favors. Shaw’s simple account makes the case for (i) in terms of the “usurpation” notion
of wrongful coercion, whereas other coercion-based accounts utilize different notions of
wrongful coercion. I mean this formulation to be compatible with the simple account and
any other coercion-based view. Defending the complex account also requires establishing
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See, e.g., Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 72; Clark, supra note 24, at 59–60;
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 45; Gorr, supra note 1, at 44; Lamond, supra note 1, at 223–
225.
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See, e.g., Christopher, Meta-Blackmail, supra note 43, at 769; Henry E. Smith, Harm
in Blackmail, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 861 (1998), at 889.
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that (ii) is true. I undertake this task in Subsection A. A full defense also requires
showing that the case for (i) is compatible with the case (ii), that the complex account can
both replicate the success of coercion-based views and improve on their shortcomings.
Subsection B addresses these issues within the ambit of Shaw’s simple account.

A. Why Blackmail Agreements Are Fraudulent: Two Arguments
Fraud is a complicated wrong and crime. The judgment that behavior is fraudulent
depends crucially on context. Actions that are fraudulent in some circumstances are not
necessarily fraudulent in others.50 Consider this intuitively plausible claim.
Valueless Fraud: It is fraudulent to attempt to exchange a token that you know
(or have good reason to know) lacks the value characteristic of the type of which
that token is an instance.
Valueless fraud implies that a core aspect (although, perhaps, not the whole) of
fraud is value. Proving criminal law charges of fraud usually requires showing that the
defendant has deceived the target,51 but deception matters mainly in virtue of its
connection to value. Say that Ben is a customer and Theresa is a shopkeeper. Ben pays
for goods with a check whose drawee is a bank that Ben does not have an account with.
Checks have value qua checks because they convey valid claims on a drawee. Ben’s hot
check lacks the value characteristic of checks for Theresa because Ben has no claims to
convey. In handing the check over to Theresa, Ben implicitly misrepresents that his check

50

See Samuel Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2006), at 1973–
1975.
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See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2006), at 153–160.
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has the value that checks characteristically have. Ben’s check lacks this value, and Ben
has good reason to know this. Therefore Ben is guilty of check fraud.52
Valueless fraud can also arise in the context of agreements. Here the relevant
value must be mutual—you defraud someone if you enter into an agreement that you
know (or should know) would lack value for her, even if that agreement would have
value for you. Thus it would be fraud for Bob to enter into an agreement with Tammy if
he has good reason to know, at the time of formation, that the agreement lacks value for
Tammy. By proposing that he and Tammy enter into such an agreement, Bob would
attempt to defraud Tammy. This insight grounds the tort of “promissory fraud”: because
every promise “necessarily carries with it the implied assertion of an intention to
perform,” a promise “made without such an intention is fraudulent and actionable in
deceit.”53
Promissory fraud presupposes that agreements are valuable in part because they
create certain obligations and manifest certain commitments. Hanoch Sheinman calls this
insight the “face value principle for agreements”—the notion that valuable agreements

52

For example, the Model Penal Code defines check fraud as the issuing or passing a
check for the payment of money that one knows will not be honored by the drawee. If the
issuer has no account with the drawee at the time the check is issued, then there is a
presumption that that issuer knows that the check will not be paid. MODEL PENAL CODE
§224.5 (1985).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §530 cmt. c (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 171 cmt. b (1981). Some deny that obligations and commitments
necessarily run together in agreements. These theorists contend that agreements in which
only obligations are exchanged can be (and are) valuable in a many circumstances,
including when performing is roughly equivalent to paying damages. See IAN AYRES &
GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005), at
93–095. However, even if commitment-less agreements might be valuable in some
circumstances, these circumstances are not applicable to blackmail agreements for the
reasons discussed below.
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characteristically involve both obligations and “relational commitments to do one’s part
of the deal.”54 If Bob and Tammy enter into an agreement that Bob (at the time of
formation) has no intention to perform, then their agreement lacks the prima facie value
that agreements have. Because their agreement lacks value, Bob defrauds Tammy
regardless of whether his subsequent behavior happens to conform to the terms of the
agreement.55
If valueless fraud is true, then whether a blackmail agreement is fraudulent
depends on whether it lacks value qua agreement. Recall the preliminary definition
offered above that the blackmail agreement is the undertaking, in response to the
blackmail proposal, through which target agrees and thereby becomes obligated to do Y
(e.g., pay money to the blackmailer), the blackmailer agrees and thereby becomes
obligated not to do X (e.g., disclose the information), and these obligations interdepend in
the way that is constitutive of agreements. We can now see that this definition is
incomplete. For example, Sheinman’s “face value principle of agreements” suggests that
the blackmailer’s intentions at the time of formation can determine whether the
agreement has value.56 If the blackmailer intends to disclose the target’s information, then
the agreement would lack value for the target. The target would be in a worse situation
after making the agreement than she was before—not only would her secret be liable to
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Sheinman, supra note 7, at 367.
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Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud without Breach, WIS. L. REV. 507
(2004), at 511–514.
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23

Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With Blackmail
exposure, but (assuming the agreement is valid) she would lack authority to decide
whether to give money to the blackmailer.
In addition to obligations and commitments regarding nondisclosure, a valuable
blackmail agreement also generates obligations and corresponding commitments
regarding unilateral renegotiation. George Fletcher contends that blackmail agreements
threaten to instantiate a “relationship of dominance and subordination” between the
blackmailer and the target, the essence of which “is the prospect of [the blackmailer’s]
repeated demands.”57 These repeated demands are a way of unilaterally renegotiating the
terms of the agreement. Seen in this light, blackmail agreements present a daunting first
performer problem. The target’s action (paying the money) happens at the outset of the
exchange, whereas the blackmailer’s action (keeping the secret) is distributed over time.
After the target has initially performed, the blackmailer might unilaterally raise the cost
of silence beyond the price contemplated in the agreement. As Ronald Coase puts it:
business negotiations (which may also cause anxiety) either lead to a breakdown
of the negotiations or they lead to a contract. There is, at any rate, an end. But in
the ordinary blackmail case there is no end. The victim, once he succumbs to the
blackmailer, remains in his grip for an indefinite period.58
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George Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617 (1993),
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Thus a valuable blackmail agreement must also generate obligations for the
blackmailer regarding unilateral renegotiation as well as commitments that correspond to
these obligations.
To illustrate this point, consider another variation on Wilde’s case:
Wilde2: In response to Allen’s proposal, Allen and Wilde enter into an agreement
under which Allen is obligated not to turn over the letter to authorities and Wilde
is obligated to pay Allen £60. However, Allen intends not to abide by the
agreement and to come back to Wilde for more funds after spending the initial
£60.
Allen would seemingly commit a greater wrong in Wilde2 than in Wilde1 (and,
by extension, greater than Allen committed in real life). In Wilde1, Allen may or may not
be committed to keeping his part of the agreement. In Wilde2, Allen would be committed
to breaking the agreement at the time of formation. Therefore, the agreement in Wilde2
would lack value in at least one way that the agreement in Wilde1 does not necessarily
lack value.59
Explaining the extent of the transgression in Wilde2 requires updating the
definition of valuable blackmail agreements. In order for the blackmail agreement to be
valuable for the target, the blackmailer must, at the time of formation, incur an obligation
not to do X and an obligation not to renegotiate the terms of the agreement unilaterally,
and he must have commitments that correspond to these obligations. The point is not
merely that the savvy target would bargain for these obligations and commitments.
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Because, as discussed below, Allen acts coercively and commits fraud in both Wilde1
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Rather, if any of these obligations or commitments were not present, then the blackmail
agreement would lack value for the target (and therefore lack the mutual value that
agreements characteristically have).
Yet even this revised list of obligations and commitments does not fully capture
the constituents of a valuable agreement. These obligations and commitments could be
generated in other ways, for example through a series of representations that engender
reliance or through disconnected promises between the blackmailer and the target.
Consider the difference between promises and predictions of future behavior or
intentions. If Allen were to promise Wilde that he would not disclose Wilde’s secret, then
Allen would enable Wilde to hold him accountable for keeping the secret in different
ways than if Allen merely predicted that he would not disclose the secret to anyone in the
future.60 Promises come preequipped with accountability mechanisms that predictions of
future behavior do not necessarily have.
Likewise, agreements have special accountability mechanisms that promises do
not necessarily have.61 If Wilde and Allen reach an agreement whereby Allen is to keep
Wilde’s secret and Wilde is to pay Allen money, then Wilde can hold Allen accountable
for keeping the secret in ways that would not necessarily be possible if these same
obligations had arisen through a series of disconnected promises. For example,
agreements allow a party to hold his counterparty accountable prior to the counterparty’s
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violating her obligations.62 By contrast, conditional promises do not necessarily allow for
this kind of prebreach accountability. Furthermore, agreements also have postbreach
accountability mechanisms that are not always available for promises.63 In order for the
blackmail agreement to have mutual value, both parties must have access to these
accountability mechanisms, regardless of whether either party utilizes them or has need
to.
To summarize, a valuable blackmail agreement requires not only that the
blackmailer has obligations and corresponding commitments regarding nondisclosure and
unilateral renegotiation but also that the target has access to the special forms of mutual
accountability that characterize agreements. If an agreement that lacks any of these
components is fraudulent, then there are two separate arguments for why blackmail
agreements are wrong.
1. The Contingent Argument
Appreciating one such argument requires two further assumptions. The first is an
empirical claim that many blackmailers lack the commitments regarding nondisclosure
and avoiding unilateral renegotiation that are required to make a blackmail agreement
mutually valuable. The second is a nostrum about criminalization: if many tokens of a
certain type of activity are morally problematic and justify criminalization, then the state
may legitimately criminalize that type of activity.64
Given these assumptions, what follows is a contingent argument about why
blackmail is wrongful and appropriately criminalized:
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(1) In any mutually valuable blackmail agreement, both parties have obligations
and commitments regarding nondisclosure and renegotiation, as well as access
to the mutual accountability mechanisms that are characteristic of agreements.
(2) Many blackmailers lack the commitments described in (1).
(3) When the conditions of (2) are realized, a blackmail agreement lacks value for
the target.
(4) It is fraudulent to exchange a token that you know (or have good reason to
know) lacks the value characteristic of the type of which that token is an
instance.
(5) When the conditions of (2) are realized, a blackmail agreement is fraudulent.
(6) If many tokens of a certain type of activity are fraudulent and fraudulence is a
sufficient basis for criminalization, then the state may legitimately criminalize
that type of activity.
(7) The state may legitimately criminalize blackmail agreements.
(8) Because the state may criminalize blackmail agreements, it may also
criminalize proposals to enter into such agreements.
Premise (1) is the definition of valuable blackmail described above; (2) is the
empirical assumption; (3) follows from (1) and (2). (4) is the valueless-fraud proposition;
(5) follows from the combination of (3) and (4); (6) is the application of the nostrum
about criminalization, described above, to fraud; (7) follows from (5) and (6); (8) is the
combination of (7) and what Mitchell Berman calls the “threat principle,” which says that
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the legal and moral permissibility of a conditional proposal “tracks the permissibility” of
the conduct conditionally proposed.65
This contingent argument can explain why the ratification objection does not
apply in cases like Wilde2. Allen’s proposal is, among other things, an attempt to usurp
Wilde’s deliberative authority. Even if some valid agreement could ratify this incursion,
any agreement emanating from Allen’s proposal would not have this effect. Such an
agreement would lack mutual value because Allen would be committed to violating it. By
entering into an agreement that lacks value for Wilde, Allen would commit a greater
moral transgression than the real-life Allen did. He would not only attempt to usurp
Wilde’s deliberative rights but also use him as a money pump. It is independently wrong
to use someone in this way. Therefore, the contingent argument also explains the
compounding effect of the blackmail agreement in Wilde2.
The contingent argument also provides a straightforward justification for
criminalizing blackmail—namely, because many blackmail agreements are fraudulent.
Almost everyone, including libertarians who call for blackmail’s decriminalization,
accepts that efforts to defraud may be criminally prohibited.66 Therefore the contingent
argument provides a reason for criminalizing blackmail that even an abolitionist could
accept.
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A critic might challenge the contingent argument in several ways. One criticism
denies the empirical premise. Historical evidence supports this premise,67 and gametheoretical analysis suggests that the behavioral patterns described in the empirical
premise would be rational.68 Moreover, the empirical premise has historical resonance.
Consider Sherlock Holmes’s description of Charles August Milverton, the fictional “king
of all blackmailers”: “Heaven help the man, and still more the woman, whose secret and
reputation come into the power of Milverton! With a smiling face and a heart of marble,
he will squeeze and squeeze until he has drained them dry.”69 Holmes’s metaphor of a
blackmailer squeezing his target dry suggests that the empirical premise resonated in the
Victorian era no less than ours. However, given the secrecy with which most blackmail is
conducted, it is difficult to verify the empirical premise.
Second, a critic might deny the nostrum about criminalization. Perhaps the
nostrum is overly broad, since it allows for criminalization of entire types of behaviors
when some tokens do not themselves run afoul of legal prohibitions. However, if a type
of behavior is on balance morally problematic, then seemingly any plausible theory of
criminalization could justify the legal prohibition of this type, even if some tokens of the
behavior are themselves harmless.70
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Third, the critic might assert that the commitment-less blackmail agreement
actually has value for the target. This objection would challenge the definition of
mutually valuable blackmail agreements by denying that a counterparty’s commitment to
act in the way that an agreement contemplates is necessary for the agreement be valuable.
Perhaps commitment-less blackmail agreements would have value in providing the
blackmailer with a pro tanto reason not to disclose or renegotiate or in providing the
target with some hope that the blackmailer will not act in these ways. Yet these kinds of
value are nonstandard. On the same logic, certain hot checks might have value. For
example, a hot check written by Bill Gates would have kitsch value, given Gates’s
enormous wealth. Indeed, a hot check by Bill Gates written for, say, $2 would arguably
have more value as a collectable than a viable check written by him for the same amount.
However, Bill Gates’s $2 hot check would still be fraudulent because it would lack the
value that is characteristic of checks. Likewise, an agreement would lack the
characteristic value of agreements if one of the parties were, at the time of formation,
committed not to act in the way that the agreement requires.71 Thus a commitment-less
blackmail agreement would run afoul of the valueless-fraud principle even if it also had
some nonstandard value.
Fourth, the critic might argue that the contingent argument is incomplete. The
contingent argument derives a conclusion about fraud from premises concerning value.

legality concerns related to overbreadth, a state might legitimately criminalize a type of
behavior that tends to be objectionable and provide an affirmative defense against
liability for those who perform unobjectionable tokens of that behavior. Thanks to Grant
Lamond for suggesting this point.
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However, the critic might contend, showing that an agreement lacks value for the target
qua agreement does not establish that the blackmailer has committed fraud. Proving fraud
also requires showing some misrepresentation by the blackmailer and (perhaps) that the
target reasonably relied on this misrepresentation. Yet, the critic might conjecture, many
blackmailers do not misrepresent their commitments. On this criticism, then, a
blackmailer would not commit fraud if he were to represent accurately his lack of
commitment to nondisclosure and avoiding renegotiation or if the target did not actually
believe that the blackmailer was committed to living up to his obligations.
This incompleteness objection does not apply to fraud in the context of
agreements. By entering into an agreement, each party makes several implicit
representations. One set of representations concerns commitments to acting in the way
that the agreement specifies. Another implicit representation is that, to the best of his or
her knowledge, the agreement could have the mutual value that agreements
characteristically have. No explicit representation is required to establish that such an
agreement is fraudulent. Rather, these representations can be inferred from the creation of
the agreement. In the hot-check scenario described above, Ben could not escape liability
by arguing that he never told Theresa that he had an account at the bank indicated on the
check. Likewise, under the doctrine of promissory fraud, a blackmailer could not escape
liability by contending that he did not represent that he would fulfill his part of the
bargain at the time of formation. The existence of such a representation (as well as the
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target’s belief that the blackmailer was so committed) can be presumed from the
formation of the agreement.72
A more pressing objection is that although the contingent argument might justify
why blackmail can be criminalized, it fails to establish that blackmail agreements are
morally wrong in a variety of circumstances. Consider the following variation on Wilde’s
case.
Wilde3: Allen proposes the agreement to Wilde just as in real life. Should Wilde
enter the agreement, Allen would be sincerely committed to keeping Wilde’s
letter secret and to avoiding renegotiation of the terms. Rather than being
affronted by Allen’s proposal, Wilde is grateful and feels no pressure to accept.
He would gladly pay far more than £60 for Allen’s silence. Therefore, Wilde
enthusiastically accepts Allen’s proposal and enters into the agreement.
Because Allen is committed to living up to his part of the agreement in Wilde3,
his behavior falls outside the contingencies of the contingent argument. Also, Allen’s
behavior is arguably not wrongfully coercive,73 even under the “usurpation” notion that
undergirds the simple account.74 Deliberative authority (like other normative powers) can
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Further, although the target’s reliance is typically an element of the common-law tort
of fraud, reliance is not an essential element of criminal prohibitions of fraud or in
statutory schemes that punish fraud (such as consumer protection statutes or securities
law). John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of
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1, at 226. On Berman’s view, the proposal would (probably) not be coercive because it
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74

On Shaw’s logic, even if Allen’s proposal in Wilde3 were an attempt to usurp Wilde’s
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impermissible disregard concerning Wilde. Shaw, supra note 1, at 179.
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be ceded, and Allen’s proposal attempts to take control over deliberative rights that Wilde
happily relinquishes. Moreover, even if Allen’s proposal were wrongfully coercive, the
agreement between Allen and Wilde would seem to ameliorate these objectionable
features, just as the ratification objection predicts. Finally, Allen’s conduct in Wilde3
does not seem obviously worse than his conduct in real life. Wilde3 thus appears to defy
the compounding effect. In sum, if the contingent argument is the only basis for
establishing that blackmail is fraudulent, then it is difficult to conclude that Allen’s
conduct in Wilde3 is wrongful.
The contingent argument, then, provides a firm basis for criminalizing blackmail,
but it fails to address other difficulties that beset the simple account. It cannot fully refute
the ratification objection in cases like Wilde3, nor can it explain why the compounding
effect is realized in these cases. More broadly, a complex account built solely on the
contingent argument could not establish that blackmail is wrong in cases where the
blackmail proposal is welcomed and leads to an agreement that appears to benefit the
target. These shortcomings suggest two options: either concede that blackmail is not
necessarily morally wrong in itself, or else find some other morally wrongful feature of
blackmail agreements that is realized in cases like Wilde3.
2. The Categorical Argument
Blackmail is fraudulent and morally wrong because blackmail agreements lack the
mechanisms for mutual accountability that characterize valuable agreements. The target
cannot both hold the blackmailer accountable for his obligations and preserve the value
of the agreement. Therefore, every blackmail agreement lacks mutual value and is
fraudulent.75
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David Owens also concludes that the blackmail agreement necessarily lacks value for
the target, although he identifies different features to explain this lack of value. David
Owens, Should Blackmail Be Banned?, 63 PHILOSOPHY 501 (1988).
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The crucial claim here is that blackmail agreements lack the accountability
mechanisms that give agreements their distinctive value.76 Many of these accountability
mechanisms operate by implicating nonparties to an agreement. The most obvious way
that third parties are implicated is through legal institutions that enforce agreements and
provide remedies for breaches.77 Blackmail agreements are not legally enforceable, so
they lack these special accountability mechanisms. Suppose that after formation of the
agreement a blackmailer proposes to reveal the secret to a third party or decides
unilaterally to raise the price of his silence. Revealing the secret would violate the
blackmailer’s obligations regarding disclosure, and coming back for more money would
violate his obligations regarding unilateral renegotiation. Yet the target would have no
way of holding the blackmailer to these obligations or obtaining redress for their
violation. The blackmailer’s nonaccountability to the target indicates that the agreement
lacks mutual value. This lack of value is problematic regardless of whether the
blackmailer actually behaves in accordance with his obligations or whether the target
ever has occasion to hold the blackmailer accountable.
The problem here is a problem of power. Agreements are supposed to give parties
special powers over each other. These special powers differentiate agreements from other
methods of generating obligations, like predictions of future behaviors. Regardless of
whether special powers of accountability are exercised, having them is part of what
makes agreements valuable. Because blackmail agreements are unenforceable, they do
76
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not effectuate the power transfers that make agreements valuable. As Sidney DeLong
puts it, the target “buys nothing certain with his payment because the blackmailer can
renege on her promise of silence and demand more money.”78
To illustrate this analysis, consider the Wilde3 scenario discussed above. In order
for an agreement with Allen to be valuable for Wilde in these circumstances, it would not
be enough for Allen to have the requisite dispositions at the time of formation.
Dispositions to live up to one’s obligations are fickle. Nor would it be enough for Allen
simply to refrain from disclosing Wilde’s secret or raising the price of his silence. Allen
might have behaved in exactly these ways in the absence of an agreement (as Allen did in
real life). Rather, the Wilde-Allen agreement would only be valuable qua agreement if
Wilde could hold Allen to his end of the deal. Yet if their blackmail agreement could not
be enforced, then Wilde would lack this authority. Therefore the agreement described in
Wilde3 would lack value for Wilde because he would have no way to hold Allen
accountable.
The abolitionist critic might object that this analysis begs the question. The
fraudulence of blackmail agreements is, at least in part, a function of their legal
unenforceability. Yet some abolitionists support not only decriminalizing blackmail but
also making blackmail agreements legally enforceable.79 This type of abolitionist could
argue that legally enforceable blackmail agreements would give rise to mutual
accountability mechanisms. If so, then blackmail agreements are not necessarily
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valueless. Rather, their lack of value is a contingent feature of our legal landscape, one
that the abolitionist urges us to reform.
Answering this objection from the abolitionist requires showing that even if
blackmail agreements could be legally enforced, targets would still lack the power to hold
blackmailers accountable. Yet this proposition rings true. Holding a blackmailer to his
obligations under a blackmail agreement would destroy the value of the agreement for the
target.
To see why, recall that one set of mechanisms unique to agreements involves
mutual accountability. Agreements automatically enable one party to hold the other party
responsible prior to violating the agreement, whereas alternative ways of generating
obligations (such as promises or predictions of future intention) do not necessarily enable
such prebreach accountability. Suppose that blackmail agreements were legally
enforceable and that a blackmailer violated his obligations by attempting to raise the
price of his silence. For the target, enforcing this obligation against the blackmailer
would require publicizing the blackmail agreement. The target would need to reveal the
terms of the agreement to third parties in order to establish that the blackmailer has
violated them. Yet in paradigmatic cases of informational blackmail (at least),80 the value
of the blackmail agreement for the target is a function of the capacity to avoid publicizing
the subject matter of the agreement. If the target’s secret were made public, then the
agreement would lack value for him. In such circumstances, the target “cannot complain
or seek help for his dilemma without abandoning that which he wants to preserve.”81 So
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even if blackmail agreements were formally enforceable, they would be practically
unenforceable. Here, too, Sherlock Holmes’s description of the blackmailer Milverton
seems apt:
“But surely,” said [Watson], “the fellow [Milverton] must be within the grasp of
the law?”
“Technically, no doubt, but practically not. What would it profit a woman, for
example, to get him a few month’s imprisonment if her own ruin must
immediately follow? His victims dare not hit back.”82
If the blackmailer were to attempt renegotiation of the agreement, then the
target (like Milverton’s victim) would “dare not hit back.” Yet the power to “hit
back” at one’s counterparty—that is, to hold him to his end of the bargain, to
avoid being squeezed until one has been drained dry—is at the heart of what
makes an agreement valuable.
This analysis supports the following argument. Unenforceable blackmail
agreements would formally lack value for the target, who could not hold the blackmailer
accountable. Enforceable blackmail agreements would practically lack value for the
target (at least of informational blackmail), who could not both hold the blackmailer
accountable and preserve the value of the agreement. To elaborate:
(9) Unenforceable agreements lack mechanisms for mutual accountability.
(10) Blackmail agreements are not enforceable.
(11) Unenforceable blackmail agreements lack value for the target.
(12) Unenforceable blackmail agreements are fraudulent.
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(13) Enforcing an agreement requires accommodation by others, or publicity.
(14) Enforcing a blackmail agreement would require publicity.
(15) In cases of informational blackmail, publicizing a blackmail agreement
would destroy its value for the target.
(16) Enforceable blackmail agreements would lack value for the target.
(17) Enforceable blackmail agreements would be fraudulent.
Within this argument, (11) is the conjunction of (9), (10), and the definition of
valuable agreements offered in premise (1); (12) follows from the notion of valueless
fraud (represented above in premise (4)) and (11); similarly, (16) follows from (14), (15),
and (1), and (17) follows from (4) and (16).
This categorical argument explains what is wrong in Wilde3. The agreement
between Allen and Wilde lacks the value for Wilde that agreements characteristically
have. Wilde cannot hold Allen accountable for living up to his obligations under the deal,
because blackmail agreements are legally unenforceable. Moreover, even if blackmail
agreements were legally enforceable, any form of holding Allen to account would require
revealing the terms of the agreement to a wider audience. This publicity would destroy
the value of the agreement for Wilde. Therefore the agreement in Wilde3 is fraudulent
regardless of whether blackmail agreements are legally enforceable. This logic is
captured in Sherlock Holmes’s comment that blackmail is among the crimes “that the law
cannot touch.”83
The abolitionist critic might contend that this refined version of the categorical
argument is still not categorical. Just as the unenforceability of blackmail agreements is a
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local contingent of our legal system, so is the notion that enforcing an agreement requires
the kind of publicity that would destroy the value of a blackmail agreement for the target.
For example, enforcement would not require publicity if there were special, secret courts
for enforcing blackmail agreements against blackmailers. Blackmail agreements might
also be enforced in secret proceedings of nonspecialized courts, in the way that many
contracts concerning trade secrets or confidentiality agreements are enforced.84 If such
arrangements were part of our legal system, then blackmail agreements might have
mutual value. Therefore, the objection goes, blackmail agreements lack mutual value
only because our legal system lacks these features.
The best response to this abolitionist objection is to concede that the categorical
argument is not strictly categorical. If legal arrangements allowed for the enforcement of
blackmail agreements without publicity for (or scrutiny of) the subject matter, then
blackmail agreements might have value for the target. However, no just legal system
would include these arrangements, and the complex account can explain why. Blackmail
agreements arise out of blackmail proposals, most of which (according to the simple
account and other coercion-based views) are morally objectionable because of the way
that they treat targets. Establishing institutions for enforcing blackmail agreements would
require the state to put its imprimatur on these coercive arrangements. As Seana
Valentine Shiffrin contends, states may decline to enforce morally objectionable
agreements out of a “concern not to facilitate or assist harmful, exploitative, or immoral

84

See, e.g., Block, Crime of Blackmail, supra note 37, at 26.
40

Coercion, Fraud, and What Is Wrong With Blackmail
action.” In such cases, “the state refuses, for its own stake, to be a codependent.”85 A
state would commit a transgression far worse than codependency or facilitation if it
established special legal institutions to allow the making and keeping of blackmail
agreements. Doing so would make the state an instrument of this domination, which
would in turn violate the state’s “deontological commitment not to assist grossly unfair
treatment of one of its citizens by another.”86
To summarize the categorical argument, then, blackmail agreements are
fraudulent in any just state because they lack the hallmarks of valuable agreements
(especially legal and practical enforceability), and a state would act unjustly by providing
mechanisms that would make such agreements mutually valuable.

B. Some Strengths of the Complex Account
This Subsection defends the coherence of the complex account, examines some of its
strengths, and responds to some potential objections.
The components of the complex account fit together, as can be demonstrated by
focusing on Shaw’s simple account. Both coercion and fraud can infringe a target’s
default discretionary authority in a way that manifests impermissible disregard for him or
her. Beyond this, fraud is highly correlated with coercion. Blackmail agreements are
fraudulent because the target cannot hold the blackmailer accountable for living up to his
or her end of the bargain. In many blackmail scenarios, this lack of formal and informal
accountability is combined with a severe asymmetry regarding vulnerability. The typical
target has more to lose from the blackmailer’s failing to live up to his or her end of the
85
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bargain than vice versa. These circumstances (along with the severe first-performer
problem posed by blackmail agreements) provide ideal conditions for coercion to
flourish. Therefore the contingent and categorical arguments about why blackmail
agreements are fraudulent address the same worry about the usurpation of deliberative
authority that animates Shaw’s simple account.
The complex account also replicates the main strengths of Shaw’s simple account.
By incorporating the simple account, the complex account can explain not only why
blackmail is wrong but also why it wrongs the target in particular. Many blackmail
proposals are impermissible attempts to usurp the target’s deliberative authority that
manifest disregard for him or her. On Shaw’s view, these attempts wrong the target by
encroaching his or her deliberative authority. However, a blackmail proposal that is not
coercive (for example, the one described in Wilde3) would still violate the target’s
deliberative authority, albeit indirectly through fraud. Proposing that the target enter an
agreement that lacks the value characteristic of agreements is a way of tricking someone
into relinquishing his full range of control over the obligations that apply to him or her.
Here, the two prongs of the complex account allow for an explanation by subsumption:
blackmail wrongs the target by attempting to take control over decisions that are within
the target’s deliberative authority, or by attempting to trick him into relinquishing that
authority, or by doing both.87
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The complex account can overcome the difficulties (described in Section I.B) that
beset the simple account and other coercion-based views. First, the complex account can
explain why the ratification objection is incorrect. Recall that according to some
commentators, it is possible for an offeree to ratify the objectionable features of a
proposal or agreement.88 The complex account identifies two potentially objectionable
features typical in blackmail: the proposal is coercive, and the agreement contemplated in
the proposal is fraudulent. It is not enough to contend (as with the legal definition of
unwelcomeness in sexual-harassment doctrine) that the target’s entering the blackmail
agreement automatically ratifies the coerciveness of the proposal. In order for the
ratification objection to succeed, the target must also ratify the fraudulence of the
blackmail agreement. Whether this type of ratification is logically possible seems an open
question. In any event, it cannot be inferred solely from the target’s acceding to the
proposal.
Second, the complex account can explain why entering into a blackmail
agreement compounds the wrongfulness of the blackmail proposal. The real-world Allen
only attempted to coerce and defraud Wilde. If Wilde had entered into a valid agreement
with Allen, then this usurpation would have succeeded. By entering into such an
agreement, Allen would have obtained mastery over Wilde in the form of having a claim
to hold Wilde to particular obligations. The appearance of this mastery to Wilde is
objectionable itself, even if (due to the coerciveness or fraudulence of Allen’s proposal)
the blackmail agreement was invalid and therefore did not actually transfer Wilde’s
fraudulence of blackmail are distinct ways of wronging the target. Thanks Grant Lamond
for showing the need to clarify this point.
88
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authority.89 It is wrong to attempt to usurp someone’s deliberative authority. It is also
wrong to try to convince someone that you have succeeded in taking control over his
deliberative authority, even if your usurpation is unconvincing or unsuccessful.90
Third, the complex account can both justify criminal prohibitions on blackmail
and avoid revisionist conclusions about blackmail’s criminalization. Blackmail
agreements are a conduit for fraud because they lack the mechanisms of mutual
accountability that characterize valuable agreements. Fraud is a legitimate basis for
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Supra, note 31, To this point, I have assumed that the coerciveness of the blackmail
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criminalization, as even libertarians who otherwise advocate for decriminalizing
blackmail should concede.
Furthermore, the complex account provides a clean way to explain why blackmail
should be criminalized whereas similarly coercive types of hard economic transactions
should not.91 Hard economic transactions do not necessarily involve fraud in the way that
blackmail does. The target of a hard economic transaction can formally enforce the terms
of an agreement against the proposer who does not live up to her end of the bargain. Less
formally, the target can hold the proposer to account by publicizing the proposer’s
perfidy to others. However, the target of informational blackmail can neither legally
enforce the agreement against the blackmailer nor publicize the agreement without
destroying its value.
In sum, the complex account can explain why blackmail should be criminalized,
why there is a direct link between blackmail’s wrongfulness and the legitimacy of its
criminal prohibition, and why blackmail differs from hard (but licit) economic
transactions.
The complex account can also reach the most plausible conclusions in Wilde’s
case and the variations discussed above. In Wilde’s actual case, Allen behaved
wrongfully because his proposal unjustifiably attempted to usurp Wilde’s deliberative
authority and because the agreement that Allen proposed would have lacked value for
Wilde. If, as in Wilde1, Allen’s proposal had led to an agreement with Wilde, then Allen
would have committed a greater moral transgression than in real life. Allen would have
attempted to usurp Wilde’s deliberative rights by making the proposal. If Wilde had
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entered into the agreement, then Allen would have either successfully usurped Wilde’s
deliberative authority or (if the agreement was void ab initio) convinced Wilde that this
usurpation succeeded.
In Wilde2, Allen is committed to opportunistic renegotiation at the time of
formation. His behavior in this scenario would lack two hallmarks of value—Allen would
lack a commitment to live up to his obligations, and Wilde would have no way to hold
Allen accountable. Therefore, although Allen attempts to defraud Wilde in both Wilde1
and Wilde2, Allen’s lack of commitment makes the agreement in Wilde2 fraudulent in a
way that the agreement in Wilde1 might not be.
The complex account can also appreciate why Allen’s conduct in Wilde3 would
be wrongful. Even if Allen’s proposal were welcomed by Wilde (and so perhaps not a
frontal assault on Wilde’s deliberative authority) and Allen were committed to refraining
from disclosure and renegotiation, Wilde could not simultaneously hold Allen
accountable and preserve the value of their agreement. The agreement proposed by Allen
would lack the value characteristic of agreements for Wilde. Therefore, Allen’s proposal
is fraud.
Finally, it might be objected that my defense of the complex account aims to
prove too much. If the fraudulence of blackmail agreements is sufficient to establish that
blackmail is wrong and should be criminalized, then why should we favor a complex
explanation in the first place? Rather than seeing the wrongfulness of blackmail in terms
of both fraudulence and coercion, why not stop with the former?
Ignoring coercion undersells why blackmail is morally objectionable. On the
simple account, both coercion and fraud can be seen as efforts to “take control over what
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is properly within [the target’s] legitimate domain of judgment or action.”92 However,
coercion seems to be a more serious infringement of someone’s deliberative authority and
thus a greater wrong. In general, crimes that coercively impose harms or losses are more
widely criminalized and more harshly punished than those that impose similar harms or
losses through fraud.93 Perhaps the explanation for this discrepancy is that although both
coercion and fraud violate someone’s deliberative authority, the target of coercion is
made to know that her deliberative rights are impinged while they are being impinged,
whereas the target of fraud is not necessarily privy to her own domination.
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For example, rape can involve both coercion (when the perpetrator “compel[s] the
victim by threat of nonphysical harm sufficient to overwhelm the reasonable person”) and
fraud (when a perpetrator “obtain[s] sex by fraud or deception”). Russell Christopher &
Kathryn Hope Christopher, The Paradox of Statutory Rape, 87 IND. L.J. 505 (2012), at
532–535. In many jurisdictions only fraud related to the core nature of the sexual act is
held to negate a target’s consent to sex; other kinds of fraud (e.g., related to
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of a coercive proposal by another. See Patricia Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by
Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39 (1998), at 102 n. 309 (contending that forty jurisdictions
have “at least one criminal provision outlawing the abuse of a position of power to obtain
sexual intercourse”). Moreover, in some jurisdictions that criminalize both rape by
coercion and rape by fraud, the former is a more serious offense than the latter. Compare
CAL. PENAL CODE §266 (2015) (“[E]very person who, by any false pretenses, false
representation, or other fraudulent means, procures any female to have illicit carnal
connection with any man” is punishable by imprisonment of up to one year) with CAL.
PENAL CODE §261(a)(2) (2015) (rape is, inter alia, sexual intercourse accomplished
“against a person’s will by means of . . . duress,” defined as “a direct or implied threat of
force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary
susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or
acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted,” and is punishable
by imprisonment up to eight years).
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III. CONCLUSION
Much of what is wrong with blackmail lies in the ways that the blackmail proposal
coerces the target. Yet existing coercion-based accounts neither explain why noncoercive
blackmail proposals are wrongful nor fully justify blackmail’s criminalization. These
gaps can be filled by the complex account, which construes blackmail as an effort to
coerce and/or defraud the target. Because I use Shaw’s simple account to demonstrate
these points, my most immediate conclusion is narrow: a proponent of Shaw’s simple
account should accept the complex account as a friendly amendment.
More broadly, any defender of a coercion-based view can and should also
embrace the complex account. Advocates of such views can continue to see coercion at
the heart of what makes blackmail wrong, explaining why, ceteris paribus, blackmail is
morally worse than noncoercive attempts to defraud someone. Yet the complex account
provides a further insight: the fraudulence of blackmail agreements explains why
blackmail is more seriously wrong and more legitimately criminalized than coercive
proposals that do not involve fraud.
Take the example of price gouging, a type of “hard economic transaction” that is
linked in infamy with blackmail but is not uniformly criminalized. In the typical pricegouging case, the seller takes advantage of the buyer’s desperate situation (sometimes, a
situation caused by a natural disaster) to charge a higher-than-usual price for a critical
good, such as an emergency power generator. On some views price gouging is coercive,94
and on other views it is not.95 Assume, for the sake of argument, that price gouging can
be coercive. Even so, this practice is different from blackmail in one important respect.
The target of price gouging at least receives the value characteristic of agreements. If the
generator does not work, the seller does not deliver it, or the seller returns later in the day
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to raise the price, then the buyer has formal remedies (like pursuing a refund or legal
redress) or viable informal options (like sharing the news of the seller’s treachery with
others).96
The same is not true in cases of blackmail. The target formally and practically
lacks the power to hold the blackmailer to his or her end of the deal. Yet this kind of
power is at the heart of what makes agreements valuable. Thus focusing on coercion
undersells what is wrong with blackmail. Blackmail is both worse and far less
controversial to criminalize than other kinds of transactions (like price gouging) that are
arguably just as coercive.
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Similar reasoning distinguishes blackmail from other putatively coercive transactions
such as unconscionable contracts and so-called “unconstitutional conditions” cases.
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205. Courts have latitude to decline to enforce unconscionable contracts. Id. Yet the party
who is offered an unconscionable bargain (or, in the case of procedural
unconscionability, unconscionably offered a bargain) is better off than the target of
blackmail in at least one way: unlike the target of blackmail, the target of an
unconscionable offer realizes some of the value characteristic of agreements. She can, for
example, sue an offeror who fails to perform as bargained for.
Cases of “unconstitutional conditions” involve “government offers to provide a gratuitous
benefit conditioned on the offeree’s waiver of a constitutional right.” Mitchell Berman,
Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO.
L.J. 1 (2001), at 2. Berman notes that despite broad scholarly agreement that at least
some such conditional offers are legitimate and others are not, “there is no consensus
regarding whether and why any particular proposition of this form should pass muster.”
Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 88. These doctrinal debates aside, the complex
account suggests that “unconstitutional conditions” cases differ from blackmail cases in
at least one important respect. Unlike the target of blackmail, a state that accedes to a
condition that is ex hypothesi coercively imposed by the federal government (e.g.,
expanding its Medicaid eligibility in order to receive federal funds) at least realizes the
value characteristic of agreements. It can, for example, sue if the federal government does
not actually provide the funds or services referenced in the proposal.
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The broadest implication of my analysis is that any account of what makes
blackmail wrongful should scrutinize both the blackmail proposal and the blackmail
agreement. Focusing only on the wrong-making features of the blackmail proposal
obscures why some tokens of blackmail are wrongful. This strategy also creates
unnecessary difficulties for explaining why blackmail is legitimately criminalized
whereas functionally equivalent proposals are not. By contrast, an account that analyzes
both the blackmail proposal and the blackmail agreement can avoid these difficulties.
Thus, regardless of whether one accepts the complex account, a full explanation of what
is wrong with blackmail should have this kind of complex structure.
The blackmailer proposes to sell the target shelter from a coming storm. But the
storm is of the blackmailer’s own making. The shelter provides no protection and it just
might make things worse. There are two wrongs here, rather than one.

APPENDIX
In this appendix, I contend that Mitchell Berman’s evidentiary theory of blackmail faces
the same difficulties as Shaw’s simple account. Here, too, the complex account should be
taken as a friendly amendment, one that helps to resolve otherwise daunting explanatory
challenges.
Here is a brief summary of Berman’s evidentiary theory. A blackmail proposal
references the blackmailer’s (B’s) future X-ing, which, if done, would harm the target
(T).97 Despite this prospective harm, X-ing might or might not be permissible, depending
(inter alia) on why B Xes or what B believes about X-ing when he does it.98 According to
the “wrongful pressure” notion of coercion that Berman utilizes, B’s proposal is
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Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 71.

98

Id. at 68.
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wrongfully coercive when (i) the X-ing it references would, if completed, be wrongful
and harm T; and (ii) issuing the proposal exerts pressure on T’s will or liberty to reject
it.99 B’s making a blackmail proposal provides strong evidence that any future X-ing by
B would not be done for good reasons or would be based on illicit beliefs, and so would
be wrongful.100 Therefore, B’s making the proposal provides strong evidence that any
future X-ing by B would (under Berman’s definition) be coercive. If it is wrongfully
coercive for B to X, then it is wrongful for B to propose to do X.101
Assume for the sake of argument that the evidentiary theory is both valid and
sound. Even so, it faces each of the difficulties that Shaw’s simple account does. For
example, the evidentiary theory cannot respond to the ratification objection, the idea that
the target’s entering into the blackmail exchange can (under certain circumstances)
obviate the objectionable features of the blackmail proposal. Because the evidentiary
theory explains the wrongfulness of blackmail entirely in terms of the blackmail
proposal, considerations related to the blackmail agreement are irrelevant to its account
of why blackmail is wrong.
Perhaps a proponent of the evidentiary theory might simply deny that there is any
need to grapple with the ratification objection in the first place. It might be seen as
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This notion is a combination of how Berman defines wrongfully coercive proposals
(Berman, Normative, supra note 14, at 55) and his contention that coercion operates by
exerting pressure on the target’s “freedom to choose otherwise” (id. at 53; Berman,
Blackmail, supra note 1, at 66). It is unclear whether Berman sees the connection
between the proposed X-ing and the pressure that operates on T as conceptual (i.e., where
X-ing would wrongfully harm T, it exerts pressure on T by definition) or as contingent
(i.e., that many prospective X-ings tend to exert pressure on Ts).
100

Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 68.
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Id. at 38.
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obvious that in the typical blackmail proposal, the target’s entering into the agreement
does not or cannot ratify the wrong-making features of the proposal.102 Yet this response
would be controversial, and it requires an independent defense. There is a big difference
between contending that the typical blackmail agreement does not cleanse the
objectionable features of the blackmail proposal and contending that no blackmail
agreements could have this effect. It seems possible to accept the former proposition
while denying the latter.103 Berman concedes that some promises made in the wake of
coercive proposals can bind the parties,104 so it would be difficult for him also to declare
that all blackmail agreements are obviously invalid. Establishing whether the creation of
the blackmail agreement can alter the wrongfulness of the blackmail proposal requires
analyzing the blackmail agreement in isolation from the blackmail proposal. Because the
evidentiary theory construes the wrongfulness of blackmail exclusively in terms of the
blackmail proposal, it lacks the resources to perform this analysis.
The evidentiary theory also has difficulty accounting for the compounding effect,
or the notion that the blackmailer’s actions can be both more coercive and worse when
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At times, Berman seems to have both advanced this position and rejected it. Compare
Berman, Evidentiary Theory, supra note 1, at 852 (“[V]ictims of blackmail, just as much
as victims of holdups, are likely to view the threatener’s proposal as a ‘threat,’ not an
‘offer,’ and to experience themselves as acting under duress,” such that their
“acquiescence” is not “‘voluntary’ in a sense sufficiently robust to counsel against
societal interference with his purported transactional autonomy”) with Berman,
Normative, supra note 14, at 70 (the notion that a promisor “simply has no obligation,
even prima facie, to honor a promise” made in response to “wrongful coercion” is “not a
convincing position”).
See, e.g., Joseph Millum, Consent under Pressure: The Puzzle of Third Party
Coercion, 17 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 113 (2014), at 114.
103
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Berman, Normative, supra note 14, at 68–69 (contending that the coerciveness of a
proposal that leads to an agent’s promising is insufficient to establish that the agent is
excused from keeping her promise).
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the blackmail agreement is consummated than when the proposal is rejected. By its own
lights, the evidentiary theory should see the compounding effect as significant. On the
evidentiary theory, coercive proposals are objectionable to the extent that they exert
wrongful pressure on their targets. Holmes’s suggestion that Milverton the blackmailer
squeezes his targets “until he has drained them” suggests that the consummation of a
blackmail agreement increases the opportunities for the blackmailer to pressure the target.
Further, the blackmailer’s squeezing the target provides even better evidence than his
making the proposal that any eventual X-ing by the blackmailer would be based on illicit
motives or beliefs and therefore would be wrongful under the evidentiary theory. Thus
the advocate of the evidentiary theory should accept that the compounding effect exists
and is troubling: regardless of their validity, blackmail agreements provide more avenues
for pressure and better evidence of wrongfulness than do blackmail proposals.
Here, too, the evidentiary theory lacks analytic resources. The evidentiary
theory’s focus on the blackmail proposal prevents it from analyzing these wrong-making
features of the blackmail agreement. Yet these features seem to be important aspects of
why blackmail is wrongful.
Berman’s evidentiary theory also does not provide a compelling case for
criminalizing blackmail. Berman contends that blackmail may legitimately be
criminalized as a form of theft.105 Yet he does not extensively argue for this conclusion,
and any theft-based case for criminalizing blackmail seems open to a host of
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Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 72.
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objections.106 In any event, each of the difficulties regarding blackmail’s criminalization
that confronts the simple account applies at least as strongly to the evidentiary theory.107
First, the evidentiary theory’s case for criminalizing blackmail is potentially
illiberal.108 If blackmail is criminalized but other kinds of information releases with
exactly the same objectionable features cannot be, then it follows that criminal liability
for the same combination of behavior and mental states can vary based solely on the
motivations of the actor. This prospect is difficult to reconcile with liberal theories of
criminalization, which do not allow the criminal status of an action to vary based solely
on the motives of the actor.109 It is also contrary to extant criminal law, which does not
make this distinction.110
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For example, the blackmail-as-theft argument for criminalization does not
automatically explain why blackmail is an inchoate crime. Someone is guilty of theft only
if he obtains possession or control over the victim’s property. See Rivlin, supra note 28,
at 419. Yet blackmail is a crime regardless of whether the blackmailer ever takes
possession or control over any of the target’s property.
The blackmail-as-theft argument also begs the question about whether blackmail
agreements are valid. If, under certain circumstances (such as those described in Wilde3)
blackmail agreements are valid, then the blackmailer’s acquiring money as part of the
exchange is not theft by the blackmailer, so much as performance by the target.
Characterizing blackmail as a form of theft therefore presupposes that blackmail
agreements are invalid and thus renders blackmail agreements central to justifying
blackmail’s criminalization.
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Moreover, unlike Shaw, who analyzes the moral wrongfulness of blackmail in
isolation of whether blackmail should be criminalized, Berman sees the wrongfulness of
blackmail as a premise in an argument for why blackmail should be criminalized. See
Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 40. Therefore any tendency toward abolitionism
counts as an internal criticism of the evidentiary theory.
108

See Shaw, supra note 1, at 196.
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See supra note 41.
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Berman posits that “there is no reason . . . that an explicit description of [the
defendant’s] motivation cannot be imported into a definition of the conduct to be
criminalized” under blackmail statutes. Berman, Evidentiary Theory, supra note 1, at
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Second, the evidentiary theory cannot provide a principled basis for criminalizing
blackmail while decriminalizing “hard commercial transactions” involving the same
prospect of wrongful pressure that blackmail does. Berman advances two different
strategies for making this distinction under the evidentiary theory, one based on the
target’s interests regarding the X-ing referenced in the proposal,111 and the other based on

843–844. This statement concedes that no existing blackmail statute allows for liability to
vary based solely on the motivations (rather than the actions and mental states) of the
blackmailer. Berman uses the example of “good faith” defenses to charges of criminal
libel to illustrate the possibility of liability that varies based solely on motivation. Id. at
844. However, this example is inapt, since the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
the legal status of information disclosures regarding public officials may vary solely
based on the discloser’s motivations. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73–74
(1964); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). Moreover,
although every U.S. state criminalizes blackmail, the majority of states either lack a
criminal libel statute or have had their statutes declared unconstitutional—in many cases,
precisely because they allow for the possibility that a defendant’s liability could vary
based solely on his motives. See David Kohler, Forty Years after New York Times v.
Sullivan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 1203 (2004), at 1232–1233.
Aside from criminal libel, Berman does not provide any other example of a crime for
which liability for the same act and mental state combination could vary based solely on
the motives of the defendant. See also Peter Westen, Why the Paradox of Blackmail Is So
Hard to Resolve, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585 (2012), at 629 (concluding that published
blackmail cases reflect the principle that “a bad motive, with which a person knowingly
performs an otherwise [legal] act, can[not] render [the person’s] conduct [illegal]”).
111

In earlier work, Berman contends that the X-ing implicated in informational blackmail
would set back legally protectable interests of T (namely, her reputation and emotional
well-being), whereas the X-ing implicated in “hard commercial transactions” implicates
interests that are not legally protected. Berman, Evidentiary Theory, supra note 1, at 856.
Although this discrepancy applies to the specific examples that Berman considers, it does
not generalize to all cases of “hard commercial transactions.” For many “hard
commercial transactions” involving legally protectable or protected interests (e.g.,
someone’s health or reputation or freedom), hard bargaining is nevertheless licit. A
surgeon can make a firm, take-it-or-leave-it proposal about her rate to perform a surgery
without committing blackmail. So can a lawyer regarding her rate for representing a
client. If so, then blackmail cannot be distinguished from “hard commercial transactions”
based solely on which interests are affected by the X-ing referenced in the proposal.
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the wrong-making feature that X-ing manifests.112 For the reasons articulated in the
previous two footnotes, neither of these strategies succeeds. Moreover, apart from
whether either strategy succeeds on its own terms, Berman should not find either of them
satisfactory. Berman concedes that each strategy yields the conclusion that some
wrongfully coercive proposals constitute blackmail in the moral sense but should not be
criminalized.113 Yet this concession conflicts with Berman’s metatheoretical contention
that the “moral wrongfulness” of blackmail must provide “a sufficient basis for [its]
criminalization.”114
Third, the evidentiary theory’s case for criminalization is revisionist in a way that
Berman believes it should not be. As noted above, the evidentiary theory explains the
wrongfulness of blackmail based on features of the X-ing referenced in the proposal, the
beliefs and/or motivations of the blackmailer, and the prospect that the proposal will exert
pressure on the target’s will or liberty. On the other hand, the blackmail-as-theft
argument says that blackmail is appropriately criminalized because any transfer of money
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In later work, Berman contends that hard commercial bargains and blackmail involve
different kinds of wrongs, rather than different kinds of harms. Berman argues that
blackmail proposals involve coercion, whereas hard commercial bargains involve the
“less serious” wrong of exploitation and, as a result, provide a “less secure basis” for
criminalization. See Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 74. Berman seems to
misconstrue the evidentiary theory here. Contra Berman, “hard commercial transactions”
are coercive under the evidentiary theory because they involve an action that if completed
would both be wrongful and would harm someone. Exploitation is a wrong-making
feature of an action. Therefore, “hard commercial transactions” propose an action that if
carried out would commit a wrong (i.e., the wrong of exploitation) and harm the target.
Therefore they should be classified as coercive under the evidentiary theory.
See, e.g., Mitchell Berman, Meta-Blackmail, supra note 64, at 798 n. 37 (noting that
Murphy’s “Baseball” case involves a morally coercive proposal that for “practical
imperatives, in our current society” we do not criminalize).
113
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Berman, Normative, supra note 14, at 82.
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or goods from T to B in the wake of the proposal would constitute a form of theft by B.115
The blackmail-as-theft argument therefore makes no essential reference to the features
that, according to Berman, make blackmail wrong (such as the nature of X-ing, B’s
beliefs and/or intentions, or the pressure experienced by T).116 Thus the evidentiary
theory’s case for criminalizing blackmail conflicts with what Berman contends is a
desideratum of any blackmail theory, namely that its explanation of why blackmail is
illegal should also help explain why blackmail is immoral.117
In sum, the evidentiary theory is abolitionist or revisionist regarding the
criminalization of blackmail in each of the ways that the simple account is: its argument
for legally prohibiting blackmail is difficult to reconcile with liberalism, does not cleanly
distinguish blackmail from (licit) hard bargaining, and is divorced from the explanation
of why blackmail is immoral.
Berman’s evidentiary theory and Shaw’s simple account share many structural
features and differ mainly in the notion of wrongful coercion that they utilize. Yet the
same difficulties apply to the evidentiary theory as to the simple account. These
difficulties, then, would seem to arise out of structural features shared by the two theories
rather than out of the disparate notions of coercion that they utilize. In particular, both the
evidentiary theory and the simple account construe the wrongfulness of blackmail in
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Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 72–73.
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Some theorists use the blackmail-as-theft argument to explain why blackmail is
immoral. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 51, ch. 17; Rivlin, supra note 28, at 419. However,
Berman contends that this blackmail-as-theft strategy does not address the “puzzle of
moral blackmail” that is his main focus. Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 53.
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Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 40 (“[W]e should not be satisfied” with
explanations of why blackmail should be criminally prohibited “that do not also shed
light on the puzzle of moral blackmail”).
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terms of the blackmail proposal. If the analytic focus of the evidentiary theory were
broadened to include the blackmail agreement, then each of difficulties identified here
might be avoided in one fell swoop.
One way to achieve this goal is to incorporate Berman’s evidentiary theory into
the complex account. On this combination, the blackmail proposal would be coercive
because it would provide good evidence that any X-ing by the blackmailer would
wrongfully harm the target, and the agreement referenced in the proposal would also
constitute an attempt to defraud the target.
Integrating the evidentiary theory into the complex account would improve the
former in several ways. This modification would provide ample grounds for responding
to each of the difficulties described above. In response to the ratification objection,
Berman could say that because the blackmail agreement is fraudulent, the target’s
entering it does not affect the significance of the wrongful pressure occasioned by the
blackmail proposal. Likewise, Berman could offer a ready explanation for the
compounding effect: consummated blackmail agreements are worse than unconsummated
proposals because, although both types of proposals involve both the prospect of
wrongfully harming the target, the former also defrauds the target.118 For the reasons
noted above,119 the fraudulence of the agreement at the heart of the blackmail proposal
provides a sufficient basis for criminalizing blackmail, as well as a basis for
118

On the evidentiary theory, the wrong involved in coercion (wrongfully putting
pressure on another’s liberty to do otherwise) is distinct from the wrong involved in
fraud. Therefore, a complex account that incorporates the evidentiary theory does not
allow for an explanation by subsumption in the same way that a version based on Shaw’s
simple account does. See supra note 87.
119

See the discussion of why fraudulence is a sufficient basis for criminalizing blackmail,
supra at Section II.A.1 and II.B. .
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distinguishing blackmail from “hard commercial transactions” that even the abolitionist
could abide. Finally, incorporating the evidentiary theory into the complex account would
capture several desiderata of a theory of blackmail that Berman identifies but that the
evidentiary theory fails to capture.120
Thus the advocate of the evidentiary theory can and should accept the complex
account as a friendly amendment.
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As noted above, Berman contends (a) that a theory of blackmail should draw internal
connection between the explanation of why blackmail is immoral and why it is illegal and
(b) that its explanation of why blackmail is immoral should also be sufficient to explain
why it is criminalized. The evidentiary theory does not satisfy either of these desiderata.
For Berman, the coerciveness of the blackmail proposal explains why blackmail is
wrongful and (on the blackmail-as-theft argument) the fact that blackmail is theft
explains why it is illegal. By contrast, the complex account can capture both of these
desiderata: the fact that blackmail involves fraud would provide a common basis for
seeing blackmail as both immoral and worthy of criminalizing.
Here is a further respect in which the complex account improves on the evidentiary
theory. By construing the case for criminalization in terms of fraud, the complex account
can “persuade committed libertarians . . . based on libertarian premises” that blackmail
should be prohibited, whereas (as Berman concedes) the evidentiary theory cannot do so.
See Berman, Blackmail, supra note 1, at 58.
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